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allocating university funds in Australia was raised. This possibility was the subject of an article in The
Australian newspaper by David Phillips, a former Head of the Higher Education Division in the Department
of Employment, Education, Training and youth affairs. The paper here considers the original problem from
both a general and mathematical viewpoint. There is a changing environment in the allocation of
resources in public policy, with more emphasis on allocating funds, status or recognition on the basis of
specific criteria and performance. Even where the analysis in this paper is not directly applicable to all
such problems, the modes of thought used here may illustrate the potential usefulness of elementary
mathematical thinking for general issues of public policy, and resource allocation in particular. Further
details are on the author’s website at http://www.uow.edu.au/~nillsen
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An application of elementary functions
to a resource allocation problem
Rodney Nillsen∗
School of Mathematics and Applied Statistics
University of Wollongong
In 1998, the West Report on tertiary education considered proposals for changing the
proportion of funds given to universities on the basis of two criteria: research and
teaching. An article by David Phillips, a former Head of the Higher Education
Division of the Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs,
on the consequences of implementing these options, appeared in The Australian
newspaper (see West (1998) and Phillips (1998)).
Phillips considered the implications of increasing the total amount allocated to
universites for research (called the “research quantum”). Assuming that the totality of
funding to the universities for combined teaching and research purposes remained
constant, this would have meant that the total allocation to the universities for
teaching would have had to decrease. Phillips calculated the effects upon the total
allocations to 36 universities for every 1% increase in the research quantum, pointing
out that the effects could be significant. For example, for every 1% increase in the
research quantum, he calculated that Melbourne University would gain $3.2 million
and the University of Western Sydney would lose $1.6 million.
Mathematically, the problem considered by Phillips is one of resource allocation
and analyzing the changes and their implications when the resource allocation
procedure is changed. This paper considers the original problem from a general and
mathematical viewpoint, potentially applicable to problems other than the original one
considered by Phillips. There is a changing envronment in the allocation of resources
in public policy, with more emphasis on allocating funds, status or recognition on the
basis of specific criteria and performance. Even where the analysis in this paper is not
directly applicable to all such problems, the modes of thought used here may illustrate
the potential usefulness of mathematical thinking for general issues of public policy
and resource allocation.
Statement of the problem
An allocating agency has a fixed amount of “money” or “recognition” which it
allocates among recipients according to given criteria. For each criterion, a definite
amount is allocated amongst the recipients on the basis of how well each recipient
meets that criterion. The total amount set aside for allocation according to a given
criterion reflects the importance the agency places upon that criterion in relation to the
other criteria. The recipients may have strengths regarding some criteria and
weaknesses regarding others, and these areas of strength and weakness may vary from
one recipient to another. One day, the funding agency decides to alter the relative
importance it places upon the criteria---some criteria are to be increased in
importance, and others are to be decreased. However, the criteria themselves do not
change. So, in relative terms, more is to be allocated on the basis of some of the
criteria and less on the basis of some of the other criteria. Also, the allocating agency
∗
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considers varying the total amount it allocates to the recipients. The following
questions then arise.
(i) How does the total allocation for each recipient change?
(ii) How does the proportional allocation for each recipient change?
(iii) Does the perceived status of a recipient change under the new allocation?
(iv) Would the changes have unforeseen or undesirable consequences and, if so, is
there a different or fairer method of allocation which could be more suited to
achieving desired outcomes?
(v) Can we determine how much variation in outcomes can be achieved by varying
the parameters of the process?
Of these questions, (i), (ii) and (iii) are discussed here in some detail, and some
further comments are made that are also relevant to (iv) and (v).
Mathematical formulation of the problem
In the analysis, we consider the allocation of funds to a number n of recipients
subject to two criteria, denoted by X and Y . Assume under criterion X that the
total current allocation is A , and that under criterion Y the total current allocation is
B . Then, if T is the total current allocation under both criteria,
T = A + B.
(1)
Put
A
ρ= .
(2)
B
Then ρ measures the relative importance of criteria X and Y in the mind of the
allocator. In the current allocation, assume that recipient j receives a j under
criterion X and bj under criterion Y . It is convenient to assume that a j > 0 and

bj > 0 for all j . Then
n

n

j =1

j =1

A = ∑ a j and B = ∑ bj .

(3)

Put

ρj =

aj
bj

, for j = 1,2,..., n .

(4)

Then, ρ j measures the extent to which recipient j meets criterion X compared with
criterion Y , under the current allocation.
Now it could happen that
ρ1 = ρ2 = ...... = ρn .
This case is “trivial”, in that there are no effective differences between the recipients
on the basis of the criteria X and Y --- there is, in effect, only one recipient. This case
is not likely to arise in practice. The interesting case is when there are
j, k ∈{1, 2,....., n} such that

ρ j ≠ ρk .
In this case, it can be deduced from (2), (3) and (4) that there are j, k ∈{1, 2,....., n}
such that
(5)
ρ j < ρ < ρk .
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Now, due to changing circumstances, and wishing to encourage recipients to value
one of the two criteria more than the other one, the allocator decides to change the
relative importance of the two criteria. Furthermore, the allocator considers changing
the total amount allocated under both criteria, and it is proposed to allocate a total
amount T ′ instead of T . Thus, using (1), there is η > 0 such that
T ′ = ηT = η A + η B.
If η > 1 , the total funding is increased, while if η < 1 the total funding is decreased.
Also, in the new allocation there is an amount A′ in place of A allocated under
criterion X , and an amount B′ in place of B under criterion Y . Thus,
T ′ = A′ + B′ = η A + η B.
(6)
In the new allocations we assume that there is an actual change in the relative balance
between the criteria X and Y , which means that
A′ A
≠ .
(7)
B′ B
Also, there are θ , φ > 0 such
A′ = θ A and B′ = φ B.
(8)
We have from (7) and (8) that θ ≠ φ , and from (6), and (8) that
(θ − η )A = (η − φ )B,
Thus, either θ > η or φ > η . The problem is symmetric in the criteria X and Y , so we
may as well assume that θ > η . Note that θ > η means that criterion X is made more
important than criterion Y in relation to the new amount of total funds to be allocated
under both criteria.
We have from (6), and (7) that
B′ η A + η B − θ A
A
A
φ=
=
= η + η − θ = ηρ + η − θρ.
(9)
B
B
B
B
Let
a ′ = the new amount under criterion X for recipient j , and
j

bj ′ = the new amount under criterion Y for recipient j .

The changed balance between X and Y is given by θ , φ as in (8), so we have also
a j ′ = θ a j and bj ′ = φ bj for all j ∈{1, 2,....., n} .

We have from (9) and (10) that
bj ′ = (ηρ + η − θρ )bj , for j ∈{1, 2,....., n} .

(10)
(11)

We now consider how the allocations to recipients change. Using (4), (10) and (11)
we see that the absolute change for recipient j is

a j ′ + bj ′ − a j − bj = θ a j + (ηρ + η − θρ )bj − a j − bj
= (θ − 1)a j + (ηρ + η − θρ − 1)bj

(
= b ( (θ − 1)( ρ

)

= bj (θ − 1) ρ j + ηρ + η − θρ − 1
j

j

(12)

)

− ρ ) + (η − 1)( ρ + 1) .

(13)

Note that the absolute change for a recipient may be positive or negative --- that is, a
recipient may receive an increase or a decrease under the changed allocation
procedure. However, in the case when η = 1 , that is when T ′ = T and there is no
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change in the total funding, (13) takes the simpler form
a j ′ + bj ′ − a j − bj = bj (θ − 1)( ρ j − ρ ).
Thus, when there is no change in the total funding and θ > 1 , we see that recipient j
will receive an increase in funding when ρ j > ρ , and a decrease in funding when

ρ j < ρ . This rather neat result is not surprising, but neither does it appear as
completely obvious. Note that in this case, by (5), at least one recipient will receive an
increase and at least one will receive a decrease.
What about the proportional change in the funding for recipients? Using (4) and
(12) we see that for recipient j this is

a j ′ + bj ′ − a j − bj
a j + bj

⎛ bj ⎞
=⎜
⎟ . (θ − 1) ρ j + ηρ + η − θρ − 1
⎝ a j + bj ⎠

(

=
=

)

(θ − 1) ρ j + ηρ + η − θρ − 1

ρj +1
(θ − 1)( ρ j + 1) − θ + ηρ + η − θρ

ρj +1

⎛ ρ +1 ⎞
= (θ − 1) − (θ − η ) ⎜
⎟.
⎝ ρ j + 1⎠

(14)

This equation shows that the proportional change in allocation depends upon the ratio
ρ j = a j / b j , but not upon a j or b j directly. The interest in (14) is on how the value of

ρ j affects the proportional change in allocation for recipient j , treating the other
parameters as fixed. Define a function P by

⎛ ρ + 1⎞
P(x) == (θ − 1) − (θ − η ) ⎜
, for x > 0.
⎝ x + 1 ⎟⎠
As we are taking θ > η , we see that P is increasing in x . Since it is clear from (14)
that P( ρ j ) is the proportional change in the allocation for recipient j , we see that the

recipients with higher values of ρ j benefit more in proportional terms (see the
Figure, which shows the graph of P in the case η = 1 ).
Now, the derivative of P is given by
(θ − η )( ρ + 1)
P ′(x) ==
,
(x + 1)2
and we see that P ′(x) is decreasing in x . Thus, P(x) changes more rapidly for small
values of x , as separately indicated in the Figure for the case η = 1 . So , for recipients
who have a low value of ρ j , any slight differences between the values of the ρ j have
greater effects on the proportional changes under the new allocations---small
differences in the ρ j will have larger proportional effects on the recipients with
lower lower values of ρ j in comparison with those with higher values. However, the
extent of these effects depends upon the actual values of the parameters in the
problem.
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Figure: the graph of the function P in the case η = 1 , where
P is given by P(x) == (θ − 1) − (θ − 1)( ρ + 1) / (x + 1).

General comments and conclusion
The nature of the new allocation method considered here is one of straight “reward
or punishment” --- that is, those recipients who are stronger in relation to the newly
preferred criterion are rewarded, while the others are punished. This method of
proceeding does not encourage diversity, but positively discourages it. So, if the
encouragement of diversity were an aim, there would need to be modification of the
proposed reallocation method. Furthermore, in proportional terms, the method does
not produce outcomes for those who perform better or worse at the preferred criterion
in strict proportion to the extent to which they are better or worse at that criterion -that is, the proportional change for recipient j is not in proportion to ρ j − ρ but
instead is determined by the value of ( ρ + 1) / ( ρ j + 1) , as we see in (14). This raises
the question of the fairness of the allocation method and indicates the need for further
analysis to understand better the effects of the new allocation method, and possible
alternatives to it. Also, the recipients with lower values of ρ j are more vulnerable to
slight variations in the value of ρ j . So, the analysis has revealed possibly negative
features that were not evident in the original description of the proposal.
The new allocations may produce a situation where it is considered that too many
recipients receive a decrease in allocation. The analysis can then be used to estimate
by how much the total funds would need to be increased to give a specified number of
recipients an increased allocation. In particular, if we put
σ = min { ρ1 , ρ2 ,..., ρn } ,
then it follows from (13) that every recipient will receive an increase precisely when
⎛ ρ−σ⎞
η > 1 + (θ − 1) ⎜
.
⎝ ρ + 1 ⎟⎠
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The analysis also reveals precisely how the outcomes of the new procedure depend
upon the given parameters.
More generally, in any mathematical analysis of actual procedures the underlying
assumptions in the procedures may appear to be reasonable and fair, but the analysis
may reveal implications which were not apparent in the original assumptions. Such
implications may even be inconsistent with the intentions behind the changes, and
may suggest that alternative procedures should be considered. The question then
arises as to the extent to which the procedures or parameters can be changed or
“manipulated” to avoid unacceptable outcomes. Conceptually, we can think of this as
interchanging the roles of the input and output parameters.
We must be aware that a procedure is not grasped merely by understanding the
immediate techniques of how to carry it out. We grasp a procedure better when we
can comprehend its effects as a whole, and understand how outcomes vary with
variation in the parameters. Then, we may grasp the procedure better still when we
can assess its range of possible outcomes against other alternative procedures. Such
an approach requires a conscious use of mathematics as more than a mere tool of
calculation, but rather as a precise means of critical reflection and of exploring
possibilities. It also requires us to “distance” ourselves from the procedure, and to
consider it dispassionately as to its fairness and appropriateness. When pursued at a
sufficiently high or intense level, involving the whole person, this type of analysis
shatters the mental barrier, common in Australia, which limits education to the
acquisition of information. Once the whole person becomes involved, the analysis can
take on an ethical and moral dimension whose justification lies beyond its immediate
aims, an effect accentuated in mathematics because of the objectivity adhering to it,
and the “distancing” of the argument from the personal wishes of the analyst.
In its concern with the application of elementary mathematics to social policy, the
spirit of this paper is similar to that of Nillsen (to appear), and further information on
applying mathematics to public policy is on the author’s website (see below). This
website information includes a copy of the article Phillips(1998). I am indebted to
David Phillips for giving me permission to make his article available in this way.
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